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Abstract
We study general properties of pairwise stable networks in homogeneous societies, i.e. when
agents’ utilities differ only with respect to their network position while their names do not
matter. Rather than assuming a particular functional form of utility, we impose general link
externality conditions on utility such as ordinal convexity and ordinal strategic complements.
Depending on these rather weak notions of link externalities, we show that pairwise stable
networks of various structure exist. For stronger versions of the convexity and strategic
complements conditions, we are even able to characterize all pairwise stable networks: they
are nested split graphs (NSG). We illustrate these results with many examples from the
literature, including utility funtions that arise from games with strategic complements played
on the network and utility funtions that depend on centrality measures such as Bonacich
centrality.
Keywords: Network Formation, Noncooperative Games, Convexity, Strategic
Complements
JEL-Classification: A14, C72, D85
1. Introduction
Starting with the seminal contribution of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), a substantial liter-
ature has evolved modeling strategic network formation. Economic agents in these models
have a preference ordering over the set of networks. Examples include firms’ profit when
forming R&D networks (Goyal and Joshi, 2003), countries’ social welfare when forming trade
agreements (Goyal and Joshi, 2006a), or agents’ payoff from bargaining on a network (Gauer
and Hellmann, 2017). Since the structure of interaction, i.e. the social network, affects eco-
nomic outcomes, such as profits of firms, countries’ social welfare, or bargaining outcomes,
it is interesting to economists which kind of interaction structures emerge when links are
formed strategically. The seminal concept of such equilibrium outcomes is the notion of
pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). A central question is then under which
conditions stable networks exist and which structure they have.
In this paper, we approach this question from a very general point. Rather than assuming
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a particular functional form of utility, we simply look at settings where each agent’s utility
depends only on her network position but not on her name. In other words, the utility
function from the network is as general as possible with the restriction that all players are
ex-ante homogeneous. We then show that ordinal link externality conditions on the utility
function are sufficient for the existence of stable networks of particular architecture. These
ordinal link externality conditions define solely the impact that new links have on incentives
to form own links. In particular, we impose ordinal convexity, which is a single crossing
property of marginal utility in own links, and ordinal strategic complements, i.e. a single
crossing property of marginal utility in other agents’ links.
We show that if one of these link externalities on marginal utility is positive then pairwise
stable networks of certain structure exist. Which class of networks arise as stable depends
on which externality property is satisfied. If strategic complements are satisfied, then a
regularity assumpion bounding the externalities from own links guarantees that either the
empty network or the complete network are always pairwise stable (Theorem 1). If on the
other hand convexity is satisfied together with a regularity assumption, then there exists a
dominant group network1 which is pairwise stable (Theorem 3).
While these link externality properties guarantee existence, they are not sufficient to char-
acterize classes of networks which contain all pairwise stable networks. To achieve that,
we impose stronger assumptions expressing a general desire to be connected to prominent
nodes which is commonly observed in network formation models (Goyal and Joshi, 2006b).
We show that with these preference for prominence notions, all pairwise stable networks are
contained in the class of nested split graphs (Theorem 2). Nested split graphs (Cvetkovic´ and
Rowlinson, 1990) are networks where the set of neighbors of any two players can be ordered
according to the set inclusion ordering. While the assumptions required for this characteri-
zation result are arguably stronger than the ordinal positive link externality conditions, we
show that in many general environments the reverse is also true such that these assumptions
are naturally satisfied when strategic complements and convexity are given (Proposition 1).
As the society becomes more and more homogeneous, such that for linking decisions the
network position of others do not matter, then the pairwise stable networks are only found
in subclasses of the nested split graphs, the dominant group networks (Theorem 4).
We illustrate our general results with respect to several important applications. Among those
is a model of network formation such that the utility of players is given by their Bonacich
centrality (Bonacich, 1987). Such a utility function arises e.g. when individuals form costly
links in the first stage and then engage in a second stage game of strategic complementaries
between neighbors in the network. Indeed, Ballester et al. (2006) show that the unique
pure strategy equilibrium of the second stage in such a game is determined by the Bonacich
centrality. This measure of centrality counts the number of paths emanating from a given
node which are discounted by the length of each path with a common discount factor.
Utility functions given by Bonacich centrality give rise to the positive link externalities
(Proposition 2) and, even more interestingly, for small discount factors, also our strong
preference for prominence notions are satisfied (Proposition 3). Hence applying our general
results to utility given by Bonacich centrality, we can conclude that either the empty network
or the complete network are necessarily pairwise stable (for any discount factor), while all
1Dominant group networks are such that there is a completely connected subset of players while the
remaining players have no links, see also Definition 8.
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pairwise stable networks are of nested split structure if the discount factor is small enough.
If, rather than sequentially, choice of links and efforts are made simultaneously, then, by
adopting the framework of Hiller (2017), we show that a general class of games satisfy our
positive link externalities (Proposition 4).
General properties of stable networks are of high interest for several reasons. Our results
may help characterize stable networks for future (maybe very complex) models of network
formation, and they provide reasoning why certain stability structures emerge in existing
models of network formation: the driving force are the link externality conditions. That our
results are applicable to so many settings is due to the generality of our approach and the
fact that the assumption of a homogeneous society is not restrictive as almost all models
of strategic network formation share this property (cf. e.g. several surveys and textbooks
including Jackson, 2003, 2006; Goyal, 2005, 2007; Vega-Redondo, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Easly
and Kleinberg, 2010; Hellmann and Staudigl, 2014).
Although the literature on strategic network formation is enormous, only few results con-
cerning these general structural properties can be found. Exceptions are Jackson and Watts
(2001) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) who use the restrictive assumption of a potential
function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) to prove existence of stable networks, and Hellmann
(2013a) who – similar to our approach – uses link externality conditions to show existence
and uniqueness of stable networks. A recent paper, Bich and Morhaim (2017) shows exis-
tence of weighted pairwise stable networks using the ideas from Nash for the mixed extension
for games. In light of their general approach, all these papers, however, are not able to show
existence of pairwise stable networks of certain structure. We fill this gap with the help of
the link externality conditions in a homogeneous society.
Assuming more structure on the functional form of utility, Goyal and Joshi (2006b) are
also able to show existence of particular stable network structures such as regular networks,
dominant group structures, and exclusive group structures2 depending on cardinal link ex-
ternalities.3 They, however, assume a specific form of utility depending only on a particular
network statistic, the vector of agents’ degrees. We show that some of their results can be
generalized such that they hold for arbitrary utility functions in a homogeneous society, such
that the ordinal versions of the link externality conditions are sufficient, and such that some
of their sufficient conditions are not required.4 Thereby, our results are applicable to many
examples of utility which are not captured in the framework of Goyal and Joshi (2006b),
Jackson and Watts (2001) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007). In these examples, our results
contribute substantially more than the more general setup in Hellmann (2013a). Among
those is the afore mentioned utility function given by Bonacich centrality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model and presents the
important assumptions and definitions used throughout the paper. Sections 3 and 4 present
the results ordered by the externalities that are respectively assumed. Section 5 concludes.
2Regular networks are such that all nodes have the same number of neighbors (degree), while we refer the
reader to Goyal and Joshi (2006b) for a definition of exclusive group structures.
3Throughout this paper, we only need ordinal notions of link externalities defined via a single crossing
property of marginal utility. Goyal and Joshi (2006b), instead use the stronger, cardinal versions.
4Note, however, that Goyal and Joshi (2006b) use a stronger stability condition, namely pairwise Nash
stability. While their existence results are therefore stronger, our characterization results are stonger.
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2. The model
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 3. Depending on the application these
can be firms, countries, individuals, etc. These economic agents strategically form links and,
thus, are henceforth called players. Throughout this paper we will assume network formation
to be undirected. A connection or link between two players i ∈ N and j ∈ N , i 6= j will
be denoted by {i, j} which we abbreviate for simplicity by ij = ji := {i, j}. We then define
the complete network by gN = {ij | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} and we define the set of all networks by
G = {g | g ⊆ gN}.
We will further denote the set of links of some player i in a network g by Li(g) = {ij ∈
g | j ∈ N}, and all other links L−i(g) := g−Li(g), where g−g′ := g \g′ denotes the network
obtained by deleting the set of links g′ ∩ g from network g. Analogously, g + g′ := g ∪ g′.
The set of player i′s neighbors is given by Ni(g) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g} and ηi(g) = #Ni(g) is
called the degree of player i.
Players have preferences over networks. The profile of utility functions is denoted by u(g) =
(u1(g), u2(g), ..., un(g)), where ui is a mapping from G to R for all i ∈ N . The decision of
adding or deleting links is based on the marginal utility of each link. We denote the marginal
utility of deleting a set of links l ⊆ g from g as ∆ui(g, l) := ui(g) − ui(g − l), and similarly
the marginal utility of adding a set of links l ⊆ gN −g to g as ∆ui(g+ l, l) = ui(g+ l)−ui(g).
Observe that in this definition, ui(g) may include any kind of disutilities arising in network
g such as costs of link formation. In many examples from the literature linear costs of link
formation are assumed, such that the utility function has the form ui(g) = v(g) − cηi(g),
where c > 0 is some constant. Altogether, we will call G = (N,G, u) a society.
2.1. Network Formation and Stability
The study of equilibrium/stability of networks has been a subject of interest in many models
of network formation. Depending on the rules of network formation which are assumed in a
given model, there are many definitions of equilibrium at hand. Here, we present only the
well-known concept of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).5
Definition 1 (Pairwise Stability):
A network g in a society G = (N,G, u) is pairwise stable (PS) if
(i) ∀ij ∈ g : ∆ui(g, ij) ≥ 0 and ∆uj(g, ij) ≥ 0;
(ii) ∀ij /∈ g : ∆ui(g + ij, ij) > 0 ⇒ ∆uj(g + ij, ij) < 0.
This approach to stability defines desired properties directly on the set of networks. The
implicit assumption of network formation underlying this approach is that players are in
control of their links; any player can unilaterally delete a given link, but to form a link both
involved players need to agree. The networks which satisfy property (i) of Definition 1 are
called link deletion proof and the networks which satisfy (ii) are called link addition proof.
5A game theoretic foundation and a comparison of the several definitions of stability can be found in Bloch
and Jackson (2006).
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The intuition behind the definition of pairwise stability is that two players form a link if
one is strictly better off and the other is not worse off when forming the link, while a link is
deleted if one of the two involved players is strictly better off deleting the link. It should be
noted that this definition of stability is rather a necessary condition of stability as it is fairly
weak. It can be refined to account for multiple link deletion, called Pairwise Nash stability
(Bloch and Jackson, 2006), to account for network formation with transfers, called Pairwise
stability with transfers (Bloch and Jackson, 2007), and many more (see e.g. Jackson, 2008;
Hellmann and Staudigl, 2014, for a further discussion on different approaches to stability).6
2.2. Homogeneity
The central assumption underlying this paper is homogeneity of the society. That is we
assume all players to be ex-ante equal in order to assure that differences in utility solely
depend on players’ respective network positions but not on their name.We will establish this
with the following anonymity condition on the utility profile.
Definition 2 (Anonymity):
Let gpi := {pi(i)pi(j) | ij ∈ g} be the network obtained from a network g by some permutation
of players pi : N → N . A profile of utility functions is anonymous if
ui(g) = upi(i)(gpi). (2.1)
A society G with a profile of utility functions satisfying anonymity will be called homoge-
neous. As noted above, players in a homogeneous society are anonymous in the sense that
players in symmetric network positions receive the same utility. The notion of symmetric
position in a network, implied by Definition 2, is such that two players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j are sym-
metric in a network g ∈ G if there exists a permutation of the set of players pi : N → N such
that pi(i) = j and gpi = g. This is most trivially satisfied if two players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j share
the same neighbors (disregarding a possible common link), i.e. Ni(L−j(g)) = Nj(L−i(g)).
On the other hand, having the same degree is a necessary condition for two players to be in
a symmetric position.
Consequently, a network g ∈ G is called a symmetric network if all players are in a symmetric
position.7 Hence, a necessary condition for g to be symmetric is that it is regular, i.e. that
all players have the same degree. However, this condition is not sufficient (see Figure 1).
Some examples of symmetric positions in a network and symmetric networks are given in
Figure 1.
Moreover, with the notion of homogeneous society, it is easy to see that symmetric links
6Some results presented here generalize to the stronger concept of pairwise Nash stability, also known
as pairwise equilibria. Pairwise Nash stable networks are immune against deletion of any subsets of own
links. Specifically, it is known that ordinal concavity of the utility function (see Definition 3) implies that all
pairwise stable networks are also pairwise Nash stable (Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸, 2009; Hellmann, 2013a).
Any result in this paper that does not require convexity, hence, also holds for pairwise Nash stability under
the additional assumption of concavity. Further, the results of this paper which hold for all pairwise stable
networks, trivially also extend to pairwise Nash stability.
7The graph theoretic equivalent to symmetric networks we consider here are not symmetric, but vertex-
transitive graphs. In this setup, we need symmetry of the players, that is symmetry of vertices whereas
symmetry in graph theory would also demand edges to be symmetric. For details see e.g. Biggs (1994).
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(b) Non-symmetric network
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(c) Non-symmetric network
Figure 1: Networks (a) and (b) are regular, but only (a) is symmetric. In network (b), two players of different
components are not in symmetric positions. In network (c), players 1, 3, 5, and 7, respectively players 2, 4, 6,
and 8 are in symmetric positions, while the network is obviously not.
provide the same marginal utility. For this, however, a symmetry on links has to be imposed.
To simplify things, note that for two players whose neighborhood coincide (disregarding a
mutual connection), links from both players to any third player are symmetric which implies
(ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1.
Let some profile of utility functions u satisfy anonymity. Then the following statements are
true:
(i) ui(g) = uj(g), if i and j are symmetric,
(ii) ∆ui(g + ik, ik) = ∆uj(g + jk, jk) ∀k ∈ N\Ni(g), if Ni(L−j(g)) = Nj(L−i(g)),
(iii) ∆uk(g + ik, ik) = ∆uk(g + jk, jk) ∀k ∈ N\Ni(g), if Ni(L−j(g)) = Nj(L−i(g)).
The proof of Lemma 1 as well as all following results can be found in the appendix. To
illustrate Lemma 1, note that Figure 1(a) is a symmetric network. Hence by (i), all players
i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , 8} receive the same utility. However, for no two players i, j ∈ N in this
network we have Ni(L−j(g)) = Nj(L−i(g)). This means that (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1 do not
apply here. Indeed, incentives to create links may differ considerably. If, for instance, utility
is distance based (consider e.g. the symmetric connections model in Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996), then for Player 1 the link to Player 5 might be a lot more desirable then the link
to Player 3. Instead, consider the non-symmetric network Figure 1(b). There, players 4,
5, and 6, are not only in symmetric positions and, thereby, receive the same utility by
Lemma 1(i), but they also share the same neighbors, i.e. Ni(L−j(g)) = Nj(L−i(g)) holds for
i, j ∈ {4, 5, 6}, i 6= j. Thus, by Lemma 1(ii), they receive the same marginal utility from
the connection to any player from the other component k ∈ N \ {4, 5, 6}. Vice versa, all
other players k ∈ N \ {4, 5, 6} have equal incentives to connect to players i, j ∈ {4, 5, 6} by
Lemma 1(iii). Note that both of these properties do not depend on which functional form
of utility we apply, but only on the anonymity condition. As an example, consider again
the symmetric connections model where we have ∆ui(g + ik, ik) = δ + 2δ
2 + 2δ3 − c and
∆uk(g + ik, ik) = δ + 2δ
2 − c for all i ∈ {4, 5, 6} and k ∈ N \ {4, 5, 6} for g as in Figure 1b.
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2.3. Non-Existence of Pairwise Stable Networks in Homogeneous Societies
Even if the society is homogeneous, pairwise stable networks may fail to exist. The following
example proves this.
Example 1. Let N = 5 and utility for all i ∈ N be such that
ui(g) =
{
ηi(g) if g ∈ {{ij}, {ij, ik}, {ij, jk}, {ij, kl, lm}} for i 6= j 6= k 6= l 6= m,
−ηi(g) else
It is straightforward to see that this utility function is well defined and satisfies anonymity
since names of players do not matter. To see that there does not exist a pairwise stable
network, consider Figure 2 where up to any permutation of players the only networks
where a subset of players receives positive utility are shown. First, the empty network is
not pairwise stable since any two players have an incentive to form a link receiving utility
of 1 each. Thus, there exists an improvement path from the empty network to e.g. g1.
None of the networks which yield positive utility for a subset of players is pairwise stable
either, since an improvement cycle as the one displayed in Figure 2 exists, where the arrows
indicate an improvement, i.e. two players adding a link which is mutually beneficial or a
player deleting a link which yields negative marginal utility. In any network not of the
form displayed in Figure 2 (up to permutation), players receive ui(g) = −ηi(g) and hence
have incentives to delete links until one of the networks in the cycle is reached. Hence
there does not exist a pairwise stable network although the utility function is anonymous.8
i2
j1 k 0
l 0m1
g2 i-2
j-1 k 1
l 1m-1
g3
i-1
j-1 k -1
l -1m0
g4i1
j1 k 0
l 0m0
g1
Figure 2: The only possible network structures which may yield positive utility for some players (up to
permutation) in Example 1 form a cycle with improvement paths indicated by gray arrows.
2.4. Link externalities
Additionally to existence problems, it is impossible to say anything about stability of par-
ticular network structures without any assumptions on the utility function. In the literature
8It is easy to check that at least 5 players are necessary to get non existence of a pairwise stable network
in a homogeneous society.
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on network formation, however, many utility functions admit certain link externality con-
ditions. By link externalities we mean conditions on how marginal utility is affected when
links are added to or deleted from a network. Hence, without losing much of the generality
of our approach, we will examine whether stable networks of certain structure exist if various
combinations of link externalities in the context of homogeneous societies are satisfied. We
will consider the weakest version of link externalities in the literature, namely the ordinal
versions presented in Hellmann (2013a).9 For the sake of convenience, in the rest of the paper
we will speak about convexity, concavity, strategic complements and strategic substitutes,
keeping in mind that what is used are the respective ordinal formulations of Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Ordinal link externalities):
A utility function ui satisfies ordinal convexity (concavity) in own links if for all g ∈ G,
li ⊆ Li(gN − g) and ij /∈ g + li it holds that
∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ (⇐) ∆ui(g + li + ij, ij) ≥ 0. (2.2)
A utility function ui satisfies ordinal strategic complements (substitutes) if for all g ∈ G,
l−i ⊆ L−i(gN − g) and ij ∈ Li(gN − g) it holds that
∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ (⇐) ∆ui(g + l−i + ij, ij) ≥ 0. (2.3)
The ordinal versions of link externality conditions are given by single crossing properties of
marginal utility with respect to additional own or other players links. If the utility function
of a player is such that once a given link yields positive marginal utility, the marginal utility
of this link always stays positive when this player adds some other links, then convexity is
satisfied. In this case we also speak of positive externalities from own links. If we replace
positive by negative, the utility function satisfies concavity. In the same sense, strategic
complements capture positive externalities of other players links, while strategic substitutes
capture negative externalities of other players’ links for the incentive to form own links.
3. Strategic Complements
To gain some insights into the structure of pairwise stable networks, we assume in this section
that the profile of utility functions satisfies the ordinal notion of strategic complements.
Hence, links become more valuable when links between other players are added. When,
moreover, externalities from own links can be bounded from below such that some weak link
monotonicity conditions are satisfied, existence of a pairwise stable network is guarenteed
and some additional structural properties concerning the empty and the complete network
are implied (Section 3.1). Using more restrictive versions of these link externalities such that
for marginal utility only link positions in terms of degree matter, we are able to show that
all pairwise stable networks are contained in the set of nested split graphs (Section 3.2). We
also provide applications for our results in Section 3.3.
9Ordinal link externalities as first defined by Hellmann (2013a) are implied by the more commonly used
but stronger cardinal link externalities (see e.g. Bloch and Jackson, 2006, 2007; Goyal and Joshi, 2006b), as
well as, by several related concepts such as α-submodularity (Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸, 2009).
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3.1. Link Monotonicity
When the incentives to form links are increasing in both own and other players’ links, then
the utility function is supermodular. However, we cannot use results from game theory, as
the structure of pairwise stable networks is different from Nash equilibria.10 We show here
that we do not need to assume positive link externalities from both own and other players’
links to arrive at an analogous result. Instead, these are relaxed in two ways: first, strategic
complements only need to hold in ordinal terms, and second, externalities from own links
may not even satisfy the single crossing property, but instead shall not be “too negative”.
To account for the latter, we introduce a quite general link monotonicity condition.
Definition 4 (κ-Link Monotonicity):
A utility function ui satisfies κ-link monotonicity if for all g ∈ G, for all j, k ∈ N \ {i} with
ij, ik 6∈ g, all l−i ∈ L−i(g) with |l−i| = κ:
∆ui(g + ij, ij) < (≤) 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik + l−i + ij, ij) < (≤) 0, (3.1)
If some player i’s utility function satisfies κ-link monotonicity and if i has an incentive to add
some link to a network, then i still wants to add the link even after i added some other link
and other players added exactly κ links. In the context of strategic complements which imply
that i keeps the desire to add a link after other players added links anyway, Definition 4 puts
an additional restriction on the externalities from own links which cannot be too negative as
to dominate the (positive) externalities from κ links of other players. Hence, in the case of
strategic complements, κ-link monotocity implies κ′-link monotonicity for all κ′ > κ. Thus,
the larger κ, the weaker is the restriction on the externalities from own links in the presence
of strategic complements. In particular, κ link monotonicity is weaker than the convexity
assumption which (together with strategic complements) requires κ-Link Monotonicity to
hold for all κ ≥ 0.
In the following we derive boudaries on κ that guarantee stability of the empty or the
complete network.
Theorem 1.
Suppose the profile of utility functions u satisfies strategic complements, anonymity and κˆ(n)-
link monotonicity for κˆ(n) := bn/2c − 1. If the empty network is not pairwise stable, then
the complete network is pairwise stable, and vice versa.
If, more restrictively, u satisfies κ¯(n)-link monotonicity for κ¯(n) :=
⌊√
2(n− 1)(n− 2)
⌋
−
(n − 1), then if the empty network is not pairwise stable, the complete network is uniquely
pairwise stable, and vice versa.
The result consists of two parts. First, if externalities from a single own link do not dominate
the externalities from bn/2c − 1 other players’ links, then either the empty or the complete
network is guaranteed to be pairwise stable. If we restrict the externalities from own links
10The non-cooperative game underlying network formation is due to Myerson (1991), where the intentions
to form links are announced. Nash equilibria of this game are immune to multiple link deletion and do not
consider link addition.
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further such that κ¯(n)-link monotonicity is satisfied, then the structure of pairwise stable
networks is very reminiscent of the structure of Nash equilibria in a supermodular game:
if multiple networks are pairwise stable, then there always exists a smallest and a largest
stable network in the sense of the set inclusion ordering, namely the empty and the complete
network. To the contrary, if one of these networks (empty network or complete network)
fails to be pairwise stable, then the other network must be uniquely pairwise stable, i.e.
the least and maximal stable network coincide. For this result, however, we do not require
supermodularity of the utility function, as both strategic complements and convexity have
been relaxed.
Let us elaborate on the interpretation of link monotonicity and the odd looking condition on
κ(n) in combination with strategic complements which basically implies that the externalities
from own links cannot be “too negative”. Since the larger κ, the weaker is the restriction on
the externalities from own links in the presence of strategic complements and κ¯(n), κˆ(n)→∞
for n→∞, the restriction on the externalities from own links gets smaller for larger societies.
We can conclude that in large homogeneous societies (n → ∞), (strict cardinal) strategic
complements alone are sufficient for the result.
For small n, instead, κˆ(n) and κ¯(n)-link monotonicity become more restrictive. If e.g. 3 ≤
n ≤ 5, then 0-link monotonicity is required for the second part of Theorem 1. Note that
0-link monotonicity requires the externalities from own links to satisfy a single crossing
property and is, therefore, equivalent to convexity in own links. As a direct consequence of
Theorem 1, we therefore get the same result in case of ordinal positive externalities since
convexity and strategic complements imply κ-link monotonicity for κ = 0. No additional
restrictions on n are hence required.
Corollary 1.
Suppose the profile of utility functions u satisfies the strategic complements property, con-
vexity in own links and anonymity. If the empty network is not pairwise stable, then the
complete network is uniquely pairwise stable, and vice versa.
Thus, in this section we provide strong existence results, as strategic complements together
with a regularity assumptions that the externalities from own links cannot be “too negative”
imply that the pairwise stable networks have an interesting structure: one out of a set of two
networks (empty or complete) network is always pairwise stable, while if there exist multiple
stable networks, then both must be pairwise stable.
3.2. Prominence-based Utility Functions
Although it is possible to gain some insights into the structure of pairwise stable networks in a
homogeneous society when ordinal link externalities are not too negative, these assumptions
are not sufficient to characterize all pairwise stable networks. In particular, it would be
interesting to examine which stable structures emerge when the least and maximal stable
network do not coincide, such that multiple stable networks exist. However, in the general
framework that we imposed so far, there is little hope to say more about the structure of
pairwise stable networks without putting stronger assumptions on the utility function.
We therefore focus attention on the relative sizes of the link externalities. By that we mean
the following. Consider a player i ∈ N and a network g ∈ G and suppose there are two
10
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m
Figure 3: The marginal utilities of the links ij and ik in the networks g∅ and g∅ + kl.
players k, l ∈ N such that kl, ik /∈ g form the link kl (see Figure3). Then by strategic
complements, if ∆ui(g + ik, ik) ≥ 0 then ∆ui(g + ik + kl, ik) ≥ 0 and if ∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0
then ∆ui(g + ij + kl, ij) ≥ 0 for some j 6= k, l, ij /∈ g. However, strategic complements do
not specify on which links the effect of other players’ links is stronger (and this cannot be
captured by the cardinal notion of either). In other words, does the addition of the link kl
increase the incentive for player i 6∈ {k, l} more to link to k (resp. l) than to j 6∈ {k, l}, or
vice versa?
In this setting it would be quite natural to say that the externality of the link kl on the
incentive for player i to form a link to k is larger than the externality of the link kl on
the incentive for player i to form a link to j. Coupled with the cardinal notion of strategic
complements which means that the externalities are both positive, this implies that the
addition of the link kl increases the marginal utility of the link ik more than the link ij.
First, we only apply this idea to players k, l ∈ N who are in completely symmetric positions
such that Nj(L−k(g)) = Nk(L−j(g)). Thus, for any i ∈ N by Lemma 1, ∆ui(g + ij, ij) =
∆ui(g+ ik, ik) and hence by above reasoning, ∆ui(g
′+ ij, ij) ≤ ∆ui(g′+ ik, ik) if Nj(g′−k) ⊆
Nk(g
′
−j). Using only the ordinal version we receive the property of Weak Preference for
Prominence in Definition 5. The stronger notion of Strong Preference for Prominence in
Definition 5, goes beyond that by applying the logic also to players with different degrees.
Definition 5 (Weak and Strong Preference for Prominence):
A utility function ui satisfies weak preference for prominence (WPP) if for all g ∈ G,
whenever there exist j, k ∈ N\Ni(g) such that Nj(L−k(g)) ⊆ Nk(L−j(g)) it holds that
∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ (>)0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik, ik) ≥ (>)0, (3.2)
A utility profile ui satisfies strong preference for prominence (SPP) if for all g ∈ G, η(g) ∈
{0, .., n− 1}n such that ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g) it holds that
∆ui(g, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik, ik) > 0. (3.3)
The notions of weak and strong preference of prominence, as the names suggest, have a
quite intuitive interpretation, expressing a preference for nodes with many neighbors. WPP
is an extremely weak notion of preference for prominence. It simply requires that if a link
to a node is desirable then a link should be also desirable to a more prominent node where
the prominence relation is a partial ordering given by the set inclusion ordering. When we
consider, instead, a prominence relation such that a node is more prominent if and only if it
has more neighbors, we receive a complete ordering on the set of nodes making the notion
of preference for prominence more demanding and therefore defined as strong preference for
prominence (SPP).
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Although the latter notion of SPP seems demanding at first sight, it may be very naturally
satisfied in societies where strategic complements are given. We elaborate this in Section 3.3.1
for the framework of Goyal and Joshi (2006b) where SPP is implied by strategic complements
as the externalities from other players’ links act homogeneoulsy on marginal utility since the
Goyal and Joshi utility functions depend on fewer network statistics (see Proposition 1).
Hence, assuming SPP instead of strategic complements can also be seen as strengthening
the homogeneity assumption when strategic complements are satisfied.
In a similar way as SPP represents strategic complements in a more homogeneous society,
we can also consider externalities from own links. We call this stronger notion anonymous
convexity.
Definition 6 (Anonymous Convexity):
A utility profile u satisfies anonymous convexity (AC) if for all g ∈ G, for all i, j, k ∈ N ,
and for all η(g) ∈ {0, .., n− 1}n such that ηi(g) ≤ ηj(g) it holds that
∆ui(g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆uj(g + jk, jk) ≥ 0. (3.4)
Similar to above, anonymous convexity (AC) implicitly assumes a higher degree of homo-
geneity compared to convexity: if a player i likes the connection to k then any player with
more links also has an incentive to connect to k. In a more homogeneous society where play-
ers with same degree have the same incentives, this formulation reflects the idea of ordinal
convexity since once the marginal utility of a link is positive, it stays positive if own links are
added. Hence AC translates the convexity notion to other players. We show in Section 3.3.1
that AC is very naturally implied by convexity in homogeneous societies by the example of
the Goyal and Joshi utility functions (Proposition 1).
Recall that we aim at characterizing a class of networks which incorporates all pairwise stable
networks. The set of networks that we will need is given by the following definition.
Definition 7 (Nested Split Graphs):
A network g ∈ G is a nested split graph (NSG) if for all players i, j, k ∈ N such that
ηi(g) ≥ ηj(g) ≥ ηk(g),
we have that if ik ∈ g then also ij ∈ g and if jk ∈ g then also ik ∈ g.
In a nested split graph the neighborhood structure of all players is nested in the sense that
for any two players i, j ∈ N the set of their neighbors can be ordered according to the set
inclusion order, i.e. Ni(L−j(g)) ⊆ Nj(L−i(g)) or Ni(L−j(g)) ⊇ Nj(L−i(g)). Our Definition 7
can be straightforwardly seen to be equivalent to the ones in Cvetkovic´ and Rowlinson (1990),
Mahadev and Peled (1995), and Simic´ et al. (2006). In particular, a network is NSG if and
only if it does not contain a path (P4), a cycle (C4) or two connected pairs (K2,2) when
restricted to any 4 players (see Figure 4).11 Moreover, nested split graphs maximize the
largest eigenvalue of networks that contain the same number of links.12
11The subgraph of some nodes I ⊂ N from network g is the network gI ⊂ g, such that gI = {ij | i, j ∈
I, ij ∈ g}.
12For a further elaboration on nested split graphs see Ko¨nig et al. (2014).
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(c) C4: Cycle of size 4
Figure 4: A network is a nested split graph if it does not contain a set of four players who form one of the
subgraphs K2,2, P4, and C4.
More importantly for our purposes, the set of nested split graphs contains all pairwise stable
networks when the profile of utility functions satisfies SPP and AC.
Theorem 2.
Suppose a profile of utility functions satisfies SPP and AC. Then any pairwise stable network
is a nested split graph.
Although the utility function is not specified in our framework, we learn a lot about the
structure of pairwise stable networks when SPP and AC are satisfied: any two players’
neighborhoods can be ordered with respect to the set inclusion order. This reduces the set
of possible candidates for PS networks considerably as the set of NSG’s only make up a very
small fraction of the set of all possible networks G.
Further, note that for this result anonymity is not explicitly required. Instead a different
kind of homogeneity is implicitly captured by the assumptions AC and SPP. These require
the externalities from own links (AC) and other players’ links (SPP) to act homogeneously
across all players on the incentives to form links. However, the anonymity property itself is
not necessary for the utility function to satisfy AC and SPP.
3.3. Applications
The assumptions in previous results may seem demanding at first sight, in particular for
Theorem 2. In this section we want to show that there exists a lot of models in the literature
on network formation that are captured by our approach.
3.3.1. Playing the Field and Local Spillovers
In Goyal and Joshi (2006b), two utility functions with a particular structure –called playing
the field and local spillovers– are studied with respect to existence of stable networks. A
utility function is of playing the field type if benefits can be written as a function f :
{0, 1, . . . , n − 1} × {0, 1, . . . , (n − 1)2} → R of own degree ηi(g) and the number of links
of other players’ links η−i(g) := 2|L−i(g)| =
∑
j 6=i ηj(g)−ηi(g) net of per unit link formation
costs c ∈ R+ such that,
uPFi (g) = f(ηi(g), η−i(g))− cηi(g). (3.5)
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A utility function is of local spillover type if there exists functions f1, f2, f3 : {0, ..., n−1} → R
such that with these functions applied to own degree, neighbors’ degrees and non-neighbors’
degrees, respectively, utility can be expressed as the sum of these functions net of costs,
uLSi (g) := f1(ηi(g)) +
∑
j∈Ni
f2(ηj(g)) +
∑
k/∈Ni∪{i}
f3(ηk(g))− cηi(g). (3.6)
Both of these utility functions reduce the network to only one characteristic: the vector of
degrees η(g) = (η1(g), . . . , ηn(g)). To establish existence of stable networks, Goyal and Joshi
(2006b) additionally assume various combinations of cardinal notions of link externalities.13
The more restrictive assumptions of SPP and AC are implied by the definitions of strategic
complements and convexity in the above utility functions which is formally stated in the
following result.
Proposition 1.
If uPF satisfies convexity and strategic complements, then uPF satisfies AC and SPP.
If uLS satisfies convexity and strategic complements, then uLS satisfies AC and SPP.
If strategic complements and convexity are satisfied, Goyal and Joshi (2006b) show that in
Playing the Field (3.5) all pairwise Nash stable (PNS)14 networks are of dominant group
architecture15 and in Local Spillovers (3.6) all PNS networks are of interlinked star archi-
tecture.16 Both types of network structures –even though distinct– belong to the larger set
of nested split graphs which is confirmed by Theorem 2 since SPP and AC are satisfied for
playing the field and local spillover utility functions if strategic complements and convexity
hold by Proposition 1. Thus, although different functional forms of utility may imply very
different stable networks we are able to show that in very homogeneous societies, the convex-
ity and strategic complements properties are the driving force for the emergence of nested
split graphs which particularly contain dominant group architectures and interlinked stars.
Since PNS networks are also PS, our characterization result is more general not only with
respect to the functional form of utility, but also with respect to the stability notion used.
A result that either the empty or complete network is always pairwise stable cannot be
found in Goyal and Joshi (2006b) although their utility functions and the link externality
conditions are far less general. The reason is to be found in stability notions used. If we
additionally assume (ordinal) concavity in own links then we get by Bloch and Jackson (2006)
that both equilibrium concepts PS and PNS coincide. Applying Bloch and Jackson’s result
13Note, if uPF is (cardinally) convex, then f(ηi + 1, η−i) − f(ηi, η−i) is increasing in ηi, while f(ηi +
1, η−i) − f(ηi, η−i) is increasing in η−i if (cardinal) strategic complements are satisfied. Similarly, if uLS is
(cardinally) convex, then f1(ηi) is increasing in ηi, while f2(ηj + 1) − f3(ηj) is increasing in ηj for all j 6= i
if strategic complements are satisfied. It is straightforward to see that our assumption of homogeneity is
straightforwardly satisfied and our ordinal link externalities are implied by their cardinal notions.
14A pairwise Nash stable network is link addition proof such that (ii) of Definiton 1 is satisfied and addi-
tionally for all li ∈ Li(g) we have ∆ui(g, li) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
15 A network g is of dominant group architecture if one group of players is completely connected while the
remaining players stay isolated, see Definition 8.
16A network g is of interlinked star architecture if there exists M ⊂ N such that i ∈ M , i 6= j → ij ∈ g
and i, j ∈ N \M i 6= j → ij /∈ g. In other words, one group of players is completely connected while the
remaining players connect have links to all players in the completely connected group but do not connect
among themselves.
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on equivalence of PNS and PS, we would require (ordinal) concavity to hold in order to state
an existence result for PNS as a Corollary of Theorem 1. Hence the externalities from own
links need to be negative, but at the same time cannot be too negative to satisfy κ−link
monotonicity for Theorem 1 to hold. These results can hence be seen as complementing and
extending Goyal and Joshi’s results to PS (instead of PNS) in a more general environment.
3.3.2. Bonacich Centrality
With our general approach we are able to study interesting utility functions which do not
fall into the class of playing the field or local spillover games in Goyal and Joshi (2006b).
One such example where more than the degree distribution matters for utility is given by
the important class of utility functions which depend on players’ Bonacich centrality.
Bonacich (1987) introduced a parametric family of centrality measures in order to formulate
the intuitive idea that the centrality of a single node in a network should depend on the
centrality of its neighbors. This self-referential definition of centrality leads to an eigenvector-
based measure, which can be defined as follows: Let A(g) be the n × n adjacency matrix
of a given network g and 1 be the n × 1 vector with all entries equal to 1.17 Noting that
(A(g))k1 counts the total number of walks of length k and letting δ > 0 be a given parameter,
discounting for walk length and chosen in such a way that [I−δA(g)]−1 exists,18 the centrality
index proposed by Bonacich (1987) is then given by,
b(δ, g) =
∞∑
n=0
δnAn1 = [I − δA]−11. (3.7)
This centrality measure is actually a Nash equilibrium of an interesting class of non-cooperative
games: Suppose there are N agents who are involved in a team production problem (for an
in-depth introduction of this game, see Ballester et al., 2006). Each player chooses a non-
negative quantity xi ≥ 0, interpreted as efforts invested in the team production. Efforts are
costly, and the level of effort invested by the other players affects the utility of player i. To
capture these effects, player i’s payoff from an effort profile x = (xi,x−i) is given by
piBC(g, xi,x−i) = xi − 1
2
x2i + δ
∑
j∈Ni
xixj . (3.8)
Ballester et al. (2006) show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium x∗ = b(δ, g).
Given network g, and discount factor δ ∈ R, so that (3.7) is well defined, the equilibrium
payoff of player i can be computed as19
piBCi (g,x
∗) =
1
2
bi(δ, g)
2. (3.9)
There are many other examples of games where equilibrium is given by a function of the
Bonacich centrality. Among those are models of production economy (Acemoglu et al., 2012),
17The adjacency matrix A(g) of a network g is a matrix with entries aij(g) = 1 if ij ∈ g and aij(g) = 0
otherwise. Note that A is necessarily symmetric as we consider undirected network formation.
18The necessary condition for this to be the case is that 0 < δ < λ1(A)
−1, where λ1(A) is the eigenvalue
of A having largest modulus.
19To see this, note that bi(g, δ) = 1 + δ
∑
j∈Ni bj(g, δ).
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R&D cooperation (Ko¨nig, 2012), local public goods (Allouch, 2012; Bramoulle´ et al., 2014),
and trade (Bosker and Westbrock, 2014).
In a stage game where players can first form the network prior to engaging in such a game,
they anticipate equilibrium payoffs as a function of Bonacich centrality f (bi(δ, g)) in the
second stage. In the Ballester et al. game, we have f(x) = 12x
2 by (3.9), but more generally
we will assume f to be increasing and convex for the results in this section. Assuming cost
of link formation to be linear in the number of links, we then arrive at a general class of
utility functions,
uBCi (g) = f (bi(δ, g))− ηic. (3.10)
When considering link formation with the utility function uBCi (g) as the objective, we have
to make sure that bi(g, δ) is well defined for any network. Since the largest eigenvalue λ1(g)
is maximized for the complete network gN , and we need δ < 1λ1(g) for bi(g, δ) to exist, we
assume 0 < δ < 1
λ1(gN )
= 1n−1 in order to define a consistent model of network formation.
The profile of utility functions uBC obviously satisfies anonymity. Moreover, the following
results states that uBC also satisfies positive link externalities, i.e. convexity and strategic
complements.
Proposition 2.
If f is increasing and convex, then uBCi as defined by (3.10) satisfies stratgic complements
and convexity.
The result is intuitive since more own or other players’ links increase the number of paths
that an additional link creates. A convex transformation does not change this fact and since
linking costs are linear, marginal utility is increasing in own and other players’ links.
Thus, we can apply Corollary 1, to conclude that either the empty network or the complete
network is uniquely pairwise stable, or both are pairwise stable when utility net of costs is
given by a convex function of the Bonacich centrality. It is worth noting that to our best
knowledge, there is so far only one result from the literature that can be applied to shed some
light into the structure of pairwise stable networks when individuals form links according
to uBCi . From Hellmann (2013a) it is known that a pairwise stable network exists. Other
models are not applicable, since uBCi does not fall in the category of playing the field and local
spillover games of Goyal and Joshi (2006b), and does not allow for a network potential (cf.
Jackson and Watts, 2001; Chakrabarti and Gilles, 2007). We go beyond showing existence
since Corollary 1 is applicable.
Further by restricting to low discount factors, we show in Proposition 3 that uBC satisfies
SPP and AC and therefore all pairwise stable networks are of nested split architecture.
Proposition 3.
If f is increasing and convex and δ < 1
(n−1)2 , then u
BC
i as defined by (3.10) satisfies SPP
and AC.
Although the utility function given by the Bonacich centrality seems to be quite a complex
object since it considers the infinite discounted sum of all possible paths in the networks, it
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is possible to characterize the set of pairwise stable networks at least for low enough discount
factors. This is due to the fact that uBC satisfies SPP for these low discount factors since
the benefits from second order connections (degree of neighbors) dominate any benefits from
higher order connections which is shown in the proof of Proposition 3. Hence, although our
results hold for general utility functions, they are still applicable to interesting classes of
utility functions and help characterize the structure of PS networks, even where no results
are available so far.
3.3.3. Simultaneous Choice of Links and Efforts under Strategic Complementarities
In Section 3.3.2, we presented a two stage game where the network is formed prior to action
choice in a game between neighbors in the network. Suppose, instead, that action choice and
link formation are done simultaneously. Such a framework is employed in two recent papers
by Baetz (2015) and Hiller (2017).20 The assumption of simultaneous choices of network
and actions simplifies analysis a lot compared to a two stage game. The reason is that when
network formation takes place before action choice as in the previous section, then the effects
of forming links on the equilibrium of the second stage have to be taken into account.21 For
instance, the resulting utility function from the second stage equilibrium outcome of the
Ballester et al. (2006) game is a function of the Bonacich centrality and is quite a complex
object. We needed additional assumptions on δ in Proposition 3 to characterize all pairwise
stable networks. Instead for equilibria in games of simultaneous choice of links and efforts,
only single player deviations have to be considered taking other players’ equilibrium effort
choices as given.
Both frameworks of Baetz (2015) and Hiller (2017) are almost identical differing only in the
curvature assumption on the value function and the type of network formation (directed
vs undirected). We discus here briefly the model due to Hiller (2017). Adapting Hiller’s
notation and setup to our framework and letting xi ∈ R, utility is given by
ui(g,x) = pi(xi,
∑
k∈Ni(g)
xk)− ηic (3.11)
such that ∂pi(x, y)/∂y, ∂2pi(x, y)/(∂x∂y) > 0 and c > 0. Hiller further assumes that for
all i ∈ N best reply effort choices satisfy x¯i(g,x−i) = x¯(
∑
k∈Ni(g) xk) with x¯(0) > 0,
0 < limy→∞ x¯′(y) < 1/(n − 1) and either x¯′′(y) < 0 or x¯′′(y) = 0 for all y ∈ R. More-
over, gross payoffs pi evaluated at best reply can be written as pi(x¯i(g,x−i),
∑
k∈Ni(g) xk) =
v(
∑
k∈Ni(g) xk) with v(0) ≥ 0, v′ > 0, and v′′ ≥ 0. One example, where all these assumptions
are satisfied, is given by the Ballester et al. utility function, see (3.8).
Given these assumptions, Hiller finds that for each network g ∈ G there exists a unique
Nash equilibirum of effort choices (see Hiller (2017), Proposition 1) denoted by x∗(g). To
account for pairwise nature of network formation also deviations by two players are allowed
for equilibrium considerations. Thus, when players i, j ∈ N connect in network g, we denote
the vector of deviation effort levels by xij(g+ ij) with entries xijk (g+ ij) = x
∗
k(g) for k 6= i, j,
20For a general treatment of games under strategic complementarities on a fixed network, see also Belhaj
et al. (2014).
21See also Baetz (2015), where the author states: “Unfortunately, such a [two stage] model is a lot less
tractable: to solve it via backward induction, one would need to characterize the equilibrium activity on any
exogenous network – an as yet unsolved problem for an arbitrary concave best response function.”
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and xijk (g + ij) = x¯
(
g + ij,xij−k(g + ij)
)
for k = i, j. Marginal utility of such a deviation
can then be defined by
∆dui(g + ij, ij) := ui(g + ij,x
ij(g + ij))− ui(g,x∗(g)) (3.12)
Similarly, when player i deletes links li ⊆ Li(g) denote the vector of deviation effort choice
levels by xi(g−li) with entries xik(g−li) = x∗k(g) for all k 6= i and xii(g−li) = x¯
(
g − li,x∗−i(g)
)
.
Marginal utility of such a deviation is hence given by
∆dui(g, li) := ui(g,x
∗(g))− ui(g − li,xi(g − li)) (3.13)
Assuming that the unique equilibrium effort levels are obtained, we can then define a network
g∗ ∈ G to be pairwise stable if for all ij ∈ g∗: ∆dui(g∗, ij) ≥ 0 and for all ij /∈ g∗:
∆dui(g
∗+ ij, ij) > 0⇒ ∆dui(g∗+ ij, ij) < 0.22 In other words a network-efforts pair (g∗,x∗)
is an equilibrium if no two players can profitably deviate by forming a link in g∗ and no single
player can benefit by deleting a link in g∗ while the unique equilibrium in efforts x∗ = x∗(g)
obtains.
Considering the so defined marginal utility of deviations, we find that strategic complements
and convexity are satisfied under the assumptions imposed by Hiller.
Proposition 4.
In the simultaneous move game of links and efforts given by Hiller (2017), marginal utility
of deviations satisfies strategic complements and convexity in own links.
Thus, we can immediately apply Theorem 1 to conclude that either the empty network of the
complete network are uniquely pairwise stable or both are pairwise stable. Not surprisingly,
Hiller (2017) finds the same result in his paper (see Hiller, 2017, Proposition 2). Hiller (2017)
continues to show that all pairwise Nash stable networks are nested split graphs. Although
SPP and AC are not necessarily satisfied it is possible to show that quite similar properties
obtain yielding increasing marginal utility with respect to the effort exerted by the players
(instead of increasing marginal utility with respect to the degree) which is the driving force
for Hiller’s result.
4. Convexity
We finally want to study the structure of pairwise stable networks in homogeneous societies
when strategic complements are not necessarily satisfied. To obtain results we will assume
that at least the externalities from own links satisfy a single crossing property such that the
utility function is convex in own links. Recall that ordinal convexity as given in Definition 3
orders the externalities from own links on marginal utility in a way that, once positive, it
will stay positive whenever own links are added to the network. In presence of this form of
complementarity between own links, the intuition is that players that already have links are
likely to strive for more. Notice, however, that due to ambiguous marginal effects of other
links, cycling behavior may still arise such that pairwise stable networks may fail to exist.
22In Hiller (2017), a PNE is a strategy profile (g∗,x∗) which is a NE and satisfies for all ij /∈ g: ∆dui(g∗ +
ij, ij) > 0 ⇒ ∆dui(g∗ + ij, ij) < 0. The difference to our notion is analogous to that between pairwise Nash
stability and pairwise stability as multiple link deletion is allowed as a deviation.
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4.1. Weak Preference for Prominence
To the contrary, we show in the following that with the additional assumption of WPP as
in Definition 5 stable networks will exist. To show existence we define the following class of
networks.
Definition 8 (Dominant Group Networks):
A network g ∈ G is a dominant group network if there exists E ⊂ N such that ij ∈ g ⇔
i, j ∈ E, i 6= j.
In other words, a network is of dominant group architecture if a subset of players E is
completely connected, while the remaining players stay isolated. Now, in a homogeneous
society if for some E ⊂ N a dominant group network is pairwise stable, then any dominant
group network of same size is pairwise stable for all E˜ ⊂ N with |E˜| = |E|. Since, therefore,
stable dominant group networks are completely characterized by the size of their dominant
group in a homogeneous society, we also write gdgm to denote dominant group networks of
size m with 1 ≤ m ≤ n. For m = n, gdgm is the complete network, while for m = 1, gdgm is
the empty network. The following result shows that there exists m ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
all dominant group networks gdgm are pairwise stable, if WPP and convexity are satisfied in
a homogeneous society.
Theorem 3.
Suppose the profile of utility functions satisfies convexity, anonymity, and WPP. Then, there
exists a pairwise stable network of dominant group architecture gdgm , for some 1 ≤ m ≤ n.
The intuition for Theorem 3 is as follows. First, as marginal utility satisfies convexity, players’
incentive to form a link is not destroyed by additional own links. Second, players tend to
connect to others that already have more links, due to WPP. Both effects together point
to networks where players either have many or no links. In Theorem 3, we then naturally
find existence of a stable networks in the extreme case, namely one completely connected
subgroup and one subgroup of isolated players.
Let us emphasize, again, that WPP is a very weak assumption. Recall that the only re-
striction imposed by the WPP assumption is that the desire to form links stays positive
when connecting to more prominent nodes where prominence is meant with respect to the
set inclusion order of the neighborhoods. As the set inclusion order is only a partial order,
the assumption is not binding in networks where no two players’ neighborhood structures
can be ordered. Further, it is very naturally satisfied in many utility functions where players
have a desire to be central in the network. As an example, consider some self-referential
definition of centrality where a player is central if her neighbors are central. Then, clearly,
the connection to a player j such that any of j’s neighbor is also a neighbor of some other
player k increases centrality by a smaller amount as the connection to k. As an example for
a utility function depending on a self-referential definition of centrality, uBC given by (3.10),
obviously satisfies WPP.
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4.2. Independence of Network Position
WPP and convexity imply the existence of pairwise stable networks in a homogeneous so-
ciety as shown in Section 4.1. However, to characterize all pairwise stable networks, these
conditions are not sufficient. The main reason is that WPP is too weak to really exclude
other network structures from being pairwise stable. Instead, consider the following stronger
condition.
Definition 9:
A utility function ui satisfies independence of the network position of other players (INP)
if for all g ∈ G, whenever there exist j ∈ N\Ni(g) such that ∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0 then
∆ui(g + ik, ik) > 0 for all k ∈ N\Ni(g).
INP is a quite strong assumption. If player i’s utility function satisfies INP, then the network
position of players with whom i can form a link cannot play a big role. In particular, it must
be that if i wants to connect to some player, then i wants to connect to any player. In
this sense the marginal utility is independent (in an ordinal sense) of the network position
of other players. Clearly, if a utility function satisfies INP, then it also satisfies WPP (and
even stronger: SPP, see Definiton 5).
Now, in combination with the convexity assumption in this section, INP has also strong
implications. When the network position of other players does not matter for the willingness
to form links, the convexity assumption then implies that a player either wants to form no
links or all possible links. Straightforwardly, we then get that only dominant group networks
can be pairwise stable. Further, existence is still guaranteed since INP implies WPP and
hence Theorem 3 still applies.
Theorem 4.
Suppose a profile of utility functions satisfies convexity and INP. Then, any pairwise stable
network is of dominant group architecture.
We may compare this result with Theorem 2. There, we used SPP and AC to show that any
pairwise stable network is a nested split graph. Note that dominant group networks are in
fact nested split graphs of special structure. Thus, characterizing pairwise stable networks
by the dominant group architecture is a stronger result than characterizing them by a nested
split graph. The conditions required cannot be compared in the same way. While it is clear
that INP implies SPP, it is the other way around with convexity coupled with anonymity
and AC.
While the conditions used in Theorem 4 may seem demanding, these only have to hold in
ordinal terms. We also show that there exist some applications where these are satisfied.
4.3. Applications
Consider, again, the Playing the Field utility function from Goyal and Joshi (2006b) defined
in Section 3.3.1 by (3.5). If convexity is satisfied, Goyal and Joshi (2006b) show that all
pairwise Nash stable network networks belong to the class of dominant group networks. For
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such a network to exist, however, either strategic complements or strategic substitutes are
required.
When computing marginal utility in the Playing the Field utility function we get from (3.5),
∆uPFi (g) = f(ηi + 1, η−i)− f(ηi, η−i)− c (4.1)
Recall that uPF satisfies (strict) convexity if the right-hand side of (4.1) is (strictly) in-
creasing in the first argument. Since the right-hand side of (4.1) is independent of other
players’ network position, INP and, hence, WPP are straightforwardly satisfied with convex-
ity. Hence, with Theorems 3 and 4, we complement and extend the results from Goyal and
Joshi (2006b) in the following way: we show in Theorem 3 that only WPP and convexity are
sufficient for the existence of a pairwise stable (dominant group) network. For this result we
do not require a restriction on the externalities from other players’ links, we do not assume a
particular functional form of utility, and we do not rely on the cardinal notions. Note, how-
ever, that existence of a pairwise Nash stable network is also not guaranteed by our results.
Theorem 4, moreover, is a true generalization of their characterization result as we show
that all pairwise stable networks are characterized by the dominant group structure. This
includes, trivially also the pairwise Nash stable networks. The characterization result hence
not only holds for utility functions which are of playing the field type and satisfy convexity,
but instead for all utility functions as long as the ordinal notions of convexity and INP are
satisfied.
One classical example in the literature, where the assumptions of convexity and INP are
satisfied, is a Cournot oligopoly where firms can form bilateral collaboration links lowering
marginal costs before competing in quantities (Goyal and Joshi, 2003, 2006b; Dawid and
Hellmann, 2014). In these models, equilibrium quantities are given by
qi(g) =
(a− γ0) + (n− 1)γηi(g)− γ
∑
j 6=i ηj(L−i(g))
n+ 1
, i ∈ N.
With Cournot profits given by pii(g) = q
2
i (g), this results in marginal profit of an additional
link ij /∈ g being equal to
∆pii(g + ij, ij) =
γ(n− 1)
(n+ 1)2
[
2(α− γ0) + γ(n− 1) + 2γnηi(g)− 2γ
∑
j 6=i
ηj(g)
]2 − c.
Clearly, as η−i =
∑
j 6=i ηj(g) − ηi, marginal utility is then just a function of own and other
players’ number of links and, hence, the associated utility function is of playing the field
type. In particular, WPP, INP and anonymity are satisfied. Moreover, Dawid and Hellmann
(2014) show that (cardinal) convexity is satisfied and also conclude that all pairwise stable
networks are of dominant group structure. Theorem 4 could have worked as a shortcut for
this result.
Finally, for completeness note that in terms of utility functions satisfying the local spillover
property defined by (3.6), Theorems 3 and 4 do not deliver more than what we already found
in Section 3.3.1. The reason is that marginal utility of local spillover utility functions can
be written as
∆uLSi (g + ij, ij) = f1(ηi + 1)− f1(ηi) + f2(ηj + 1)− f3(ηj)− c.
Thus, utility functions of local spillovers type satisfy WPP only if f2(ηj + 1) − f3(ηj) as a
function of ηj crosses the point f1(ηi + 1) − f1(ηi) − c just once for all 1 ≤ ηi ≤ n. This is
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due to the fact that for every 1 ≤ ηi ≤ n and for every 1 ≤ ηj ≤ ηk ≤ n, we can always find
a network such that Nj \ {k} ⊂ Nk \ {j}. But note that this defines strategic complements
for local spillover utility functions which implies also that SPP is satisfied by Proposition 1.
Hence, even though much weaker for general utility functions, WPP coincides with SPP for
utility functions satisfying the local spillover property. Since convexity of uLS implies AC we
can then directly apply Theorem 2 delivering stronger results than Theorem 3. Requiring
INP for uLS is too strong as it implies that either all f2(ηj + 1) − f3(ηj) as a function of
ηj lie above the point f1(ηi + 1) − f1(ηi) − c or all lie below f1(ηi + 1) − f1(ηi) − c for all
ηi. Expressed in cardinal terms, f2(ηj + 1)− f3(ηj) must be a constant, implying uLS is of
Playing the Field type which is constant in the second argument.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that in a very general environment of network formation, it is possible to
derive results on the structural properties of pairwise stable networks by exploiting the or-
dinal link externality conditions in a homogeneous society. While almost all models in the
literature (that we can think of) share the homogeneity assumption, we have shown that the
link externality conditions are also quite often satisfied. This paper hence contributes to a
better understanding what the driving force for the structure of pairwise stable networks in
those model are: the link externality conditions. The results in this paper may, moreover,
be used to characterize pairwise stable networks in future even very complex models of net-
work formation that satisfy the link externality conditions (which e.g. arise from multistage
games).
For the results on existence of pairwise stable networks, we do not rely on the assumptions
of a potential function which is very restrictive or on the assumption of supermodularity of
the utility function. Instead, supermodularity can be weakened such that the externalities
from own links only satisfy a boundary condition while the externalities from other players’
links only need to satisfy a single crossing property to have the structure of pairwise stable
networks like the structure of Nash equilibria in supermodular games.
We have thereby improved on the literature that also use the link externality conditions to
derive structural properties of stable networks. Compared to Hellmann (2013a), we are able
to show existence of pairwise stable networks of specific structures like the empty and the
complete network or the dominant group structure. The only additional assumption made is
that of a homogeneous society while some other assumptions are relaxed (like the externality
conditions of either own or other players links). On the other hand we have generalized some
of the results in Goyal and Joshi (2006b): they hold for arbitrary functional forms of utility,
they require only ordinal versions of externalities and some assumptions are not even needed.
While the present work exhibits a focus on positive link externalities it would be interesting
for future research to show similar results in case of negative link externalities. Our conjecture
for the case of both concavity and strategic substitutes however is that existence of pairwise
stable networks is not always guaranteed. Second, a full characterization of pairwise stable
networks if utility profiles are functions of Bonacich centrality still remains an open question.
While we provide a first contribution to this goal, proving existence of a pairwise stable
network for any discount factor and characterizing stable networks for low discount factors,
it still remains a challenge to characterize stable networks for the rest of the set of admissible
discount factors.
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6. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let the profile of utility functions u satisfy anonymity.
(i). Suppose that i, j ∈ N are symmetric such that there exists a permutation pi with pi(i) = j
and gpi = g. Then by anonymity, we get
ui(g) = upi(i)(gpi) = uj(g).
(ii). Now let i, j ∈ N such that Ni(L−j(g)) = Nj(L−i(g)). Define piij as the permutation
where players i and j switch positions, that is
piij : N → N, piij(k) = k ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j}, piij(i) = j.
Then since Ni(L−j(g)) = Nj(L−i(g)) we have gpiij = g. Take now any k ∈ N\{i, j} and
define g˜ = g + ik. Anonymity then yields
ui(g + ik) = ui(g˜) = upiij(i)(g˜piij ) = uj(g + jk).
Then it directly follows that
∆ui(g + ik, ik) = ui(g + ik)− ui(g) = uj(g + jk)− uj(g) = ∆uj(g + jk, jk).
(iii). By the same arguments as in (ii) we get
uk(g + ik) = uk(g˜) = upiij(k)(g˜piij ) = uk(g + jk).
and consequently
∆uk(g + ik, ik) = uk(g + ik)− uk(g) = uk(g + jk)− uk(g) = ∆uj(g + jk, jk).
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose the empty network g∅ is not pairwise stable (otherwise there
is nothing to show). Then by Definition 1, there exists i, j ∈ N such that 0 < ∆ui(g∅ +
ij, ij). Moreover, suppose that the profile of utility functions u satisfies anonymity. Then by
Lemma 1, 0 < ∆ui(g
∅ + ij, ij) for all i, j ∈ N .
Further, suppose the profile of utility functions u satisfies strategic complements and κ-
link monotonicity for some κ ∈ N. Let g ∈ G \ {g∅, gN} and suppose there exist a player
i ∈ N with ηi(g) ≤ κη−i(g). We first show that (if the empty network is not stable) such a
player has an incentive to add any link ij /∈ g. If ηi(g) = 0, then by strategic complements
0 < ∆ui(g
∅ + ij, ij) ⇒ 0 < ui
(
g∅ + L−i(g) + ij, ij
)
. Otherwise if ηi(g) > 0, we can label
the set of i′s links by Li(g) = {ij1, ..., ijηi(g)}. Since κ ∈ N and ηi(g) ≤ κη−i(g), we can
then partition the set L−i(g) into ηi(g) disjoint subsets l−i1 , l
−i
2 , . . . l
−i
ηi(g)
⊂ L−i(g) such that
l−i0
·∪ l−i1
·∪ . . . ·∪ l−iηi(g) = L−i(g), and |l
−i
k | ≥ κ for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ηi(g)}. Since for all g′ ∈ G,
ij, ik /∈ g′ and l′−i ∈ L−i(gN − g′) such that |l′−i| ≥ κ we can find a partition lκ−i
·∪ l+−i = l−i
with l′−i = κ, we get by applying strategic complements and κ-link monotonicity,
0 < ∆ui(g
′ + ij, ij)⇒ 0 < ui(g′ + l+−i + ij, ij)
⇒ 0 < ui(g′ + l+−i + ik + lκ−i + ij, ij) = ui(g′ + l−i + ik + ij, ij)
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We conclude using induction over 1 ≤ k ≤ ηi(g),
0 < ∆ui(g
∅ + ij, ij)⇒ 0 < ui(g∅ + ij1 + l−i1 + ij, ij)
⇒ 0 < ui(g∅ + ij1 + ij2 + l−i1 + l−i2 + ij, ij)
⇒ . . .⇒ 0 < ui
(
g∅ + ∪ηi(g)k=1
(
ijk + l
−i
k
)
+ ij, ij
)
Thus if the empty network is not PS, then for any g ∈ G any player i ∈ N with ηi(g) ≤
κη−i(g) has an incentive to add any link and (analogously) has no incentive to delete a link.
This implies that for a network g ∈ G \ {g∅, gN} to be pairwise stable, the set of players
Eκ(g) := {i ∈ N |ηi(g) ≤ κη−i(g)} has to be completely connected.
To show the first part of the Theorem, let κˆ link monotonicity be satisfied with κˆ = bn/2c−1.
Note that in the complete network gN , we have ηi = n−1 and η−i = (n−1)(n−2)/2−(n−1) =
(n− 2)/2 implying ηi ≤ κˆη−i for all i ∈ N . Thus by above, if the empty network is not PS,
then ∆ui(g
N , ij) > 0 for all i, j ∈ N and, thus, the complete network is PS. Analogously,
the empty network is PS if the complete network is not PS, implying the first part of the
statement.
For the second part, let κ¯ :=
⌊√
2(n− 1)(n− 2)
⌋
− (n− 1). To show that no other network
than the complete network can be PS if the empty network is not PS, we now show that
E := Eκ¯(g) cannot be completely connected for all g ∈ G\{g∅, gN}. Suppose to the contrary
that it is and take i ∈ arg min
j∈EC
{ηj} where EC := N \E denotes the complement of E. Since
L−i = g − Li(g), we get η−iηi =
|g|−ηi
ηi
. Note that since E is completely connected we have
|g| = |E|(|E|−1)2 +
∑
j∈EC ηj −
∣∣{ij ∈ g|i, j ∈ EC}∣∣. Thus,
η−i
ηi
=
1
ηi
 |E|(|E| − 1)
2
+
∑
j∈EC
ηj −
∣∣{ij ∈ g|i, j ∈ EC}∣∣− ηi
 (6.1)
For a fixed degree distribution (ηj)j∈EC the right hand side of (6.1) is clearly minimal if∣∣{ij ∈ g|i, j ∈ EC}∣∣ is maximal, meaning that it is minimal if there do not exist links between
E and EC , such that the minimum is achieved at
∣∣{ij ∈ g|i, j ∈ EC}∣∣ = 12 ∑j∈EC ηj . Hence,
η−i
ηi
≥ 1
ηi
 |E|(|E| − 1)
2
+
1
2
∑
j∈EC
ηj − ηi

By construction, ηi ≤ ηj for all j ∈ EC . Thus,
η−i
ηi
≥ 1
ηi
( |E|(|E| − 1)
2
+
1
2
(∣∣EC∣∣− 2) ηi) (6.2)
Since the right hand side of (6.2) is decreasing in ηi, choosing ηi maximial (such that the
maximum is achieved when EC is completely connected, i.e. ηi =
∣∣EC∣∣− 1) obtains,
η−i
ηi
≥ 1
2 (EC − 1)
(|E|(|E| − 1) + (∣∣EC∣∣− 2) (∣∣EC∣∣− 1)) (6.3)
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Now, setting k :=
∣∣EC∣∣ − 1 and, hence, n − k − 1 = |E|, we can find a lower bound for
the right hand side of (6.3) by minimizing with respect to k ∈ R. Solving the optimization
problem
min
k∈R
1
2k ((n− k − 1)(n− k − 2) + k(k − 1))
we get k∗ :=
√
(n−1)(n−2)
2 as a global minimum which implies,
η−i
ηi
≥ 12k∗ ((n− k∗ − 1)(n− k∗ − 2) + k∗(k∗ − 1)) =
√
2(n− 1)(n− 2)− (n− 1)
≥
⌊√
2(n− 1)(n− 2)
⌋
− (n− 1) = κ¯.
Which contradicts our assumption that i ∈ EC . Thus either E cannot be completely con-
nected which means there exists two players i, j ∈ E which have a strict incentive to form a
link contradicting pairwise stability, or EC is the empty set which contradicts that we chose
g 6= gN . Thus, no network other than the complete network can be pairwise stable. Stability
of the complete network is easily checked as
η−i
ηi
=
(n− 1)(n− 2)
n− 1 = n− 2
n≥3
≥
⌊√
2(n− 1)(n− 2)
⌋
− (n− 1) = κ¯
implying that all players have an incentive to keep their links in the complete network by
κ¯-link monotonicity.23 We have hence shown that if the empty network is not PS then the
complete network is uniquely PS. Completely analogous arguments constitute the reverse
implication.
Proof of Corollary 1. First note that by convexity and strategic complements,
∆ui(g + ij, ij)(≥) > 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik + ij, ij)(≥) > 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + l−i + ik + ij, ij)(≥) > 0
for all l−i ∈ L−i(gN − g) with 0 ≤ |li|, i.e. 0-link monotonicity is satisfied. The statement is
then directly implied by Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a pairwise stable network
which is not a nested split graph. Then by definition there exists a set of three distinct
players i, j, k, such that ηi(g) ≥ ηj(g) ≥ ηk(g), and either ik ∈ g while ij /∈ g or jk ∈ g while
ik /∈ g.
Suppose first ik ∈ g, ij /∈ g. Since g is assumed to be stable, we have ∆ui(g, ik) ≥ 0 and
∆uk(g, ik) ≥ 0. Then however
∆ui(g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ij, ij) > 0,
following by SPP, and further
∆uk(g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆uj(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0,
following by AC. Thus i and j would want to add a link to g, contradicting pairwise stability.
23For n = 2 the statement of the proposition is trivially satisfied without any additional assumptions.
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If on the other hand jk ∈ g, ik /∈ g we can argue similarly
∆uk(g, jk) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆uk(g + ik, ik) > 0,
by SPP, and
∆uj(g, jk) ≥ 0⇒ ∆ui(g + ik, ik) ≥ 0,
by anonymous convexity. Again, i and k would want to add a link, so that g cannot be
stable.
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Let i, j ∈ N such that ηi ≤ ηj implying η−i ≥ η−j . Letting
k ∈ N , k 6= i, j, we get by convexity and strategic complements,
∆uPFj (g + jk, jk) = f(ηj + 1, η−j)− f(ηj , η−j)
≥ f(ηi, η−j)− f(ηi − 1, η−j)
≥ f(ηi, η−i)− f(ηi − 1, η−i)
= ∆uPFi (g, ik),
which implies AC according to Definition 6. Further, since degree of neighbors do not
matter,
∆uPFk (g + ik, ik) = f(ηk + 1, η−k)− f(ηk, η−k) = ∆uPFk (g + jk, jk),
which implies SPP according to Definition 5.
(ii) Let i, j ∈ N such that ηi ≤ ηj . Let k ∈ N , k 6= i, j. We have by convexity and strategic
complements,
∆uLSj (g + jk, jk) = f1(ηj + 1)− f1(ηj) + f2(ηk + 1)− f3(ηk)
≥ f1(ηi)− f1(ηi − 1) + f2(ηk)− f3(ηk − 1)
= ∆uPFi (g, ik),
which implies AC according to Definition 6. Finally, because of strategic complements
alone,
∆uLSk (g + jk, jk) = f1(ηk + 1)− f1(ηk) + f2(ηj + 1)− f3(ηj)
≥ f1(ηk + 1)− f1(ηk) + f2(ηi + 1)− f3(ηi)
= ∆uPFk (g, ik),
implying SPP according to Definition 5.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we show (more generally) by induction over k ∈ N that (A′ + B)k−
(A′)k ≥ (A + B)k− (A)k if for all nonnegative n×n matrixes A,A′,B with A ≤ A′, where
for matrices A and B we write A ≤ B, if and only if the entries satisfy aij ≥ bij for all
i, j ∈ N .
For k = 1, we have the assertion satisfied with equality,(
A′ + B
)1 − (A′)1 = B = (A + B)1 − (A)1
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Now suppose that the assertion holds for some k ∈ N. Then,(
A′ + B
)k − (A′)k ≥ (A + B)k − (A)k
⇒ (A′ + B)
((
A′ + B
)k − (A′)k) ≥ (A + B)((A + B)k − (A)k)
⇔ (A′ + B)k+1 − (A′)k+1 −B (A′)k ≥ (A + B)k+1 − (A)k+1 −B (A)k
⇒ (A′ + B)k+1 − (A′)k+1 ≥ (A + B)k+1 − (A)k+1
where we repeatedly used that A′ ≥ A. Thus for g, g′ ∈ G, with g ⊂ g′ and ij /∈ g′ we can
set A := A(g), A′ := A(g′) and B := A(ij) implying A ≤ A′ and we obtain
b(g′ + ij, δ)− b(g′, δ) =
n∑
k=0
(
A′ + B
)k − (A′)k ≥ n∑
k=0
(A + B)k − (A)k = b(g + ij, δ)− b(g, δ).
Since f is an increasing and convex function and bi(g
′+ij, δ) ≥ bi(g′, δ) ≥ 0 and bi(g+ij, δ) ≥
bi(g, δ) ≥ 0, we then have,
uBCi (g
′ + ij)− uBCi (g′) = f(bi(g′ + ij, δ))− f(bi(g′, δ))− c
≥ f(bi(g + ij, δ))− f(bi(g, δ))− c
= uBCi (g + ij)− uBCi (g),
Letting g′ and g being such that g′ − g ⊂ L−i(gN − g) we obtain the (cardinal) strategic
complements property and letting g′ and g being such that g′ − g ⊂ Li(gN − g) we obtain
(cardinal) convexity.
Proof of Proposition 3. Remember that
uBCi =f(bi(g))− ηi(g)c = f(e′i(
∞∑
t=0
δtAt)1)− ηi(g)c,
with A being the adjacency matrix of network g and ei the i-th unit vector. Take some
players i, j, k ∈ N and a network g such that ij ∈ g, ik /∈ g and ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g). We get,
∆uBCi (g + ik, ik) =f(bi(g + ik))− f(bi(g))− c
=f(bi(g) + δ + δ
2(ηk(g) + 1) + e
′
i(
∞∑
t=3
δt((A + A(ik))t −At)1)
− f(bi(g))− c,
≥f(bi(g) + δ + δ2(ηk(g) + 1))− f(bi(g))− c,
We can find an upper bound for the marginal utility of deleting j by considering utility of
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the complete network from order 3 on,24
∆uBCi (g, ij) ≤f(bi(g) + δ + δ2(ηj(g)) +
∞∑
t=3
δtηj(g)(n− 1)t−2)− f(bi(g))− c,
=f(bi(g) + δ + δ
2ηj(g) + δ
2ηj(g)(
∞∑
t=0
δt(n− 1)t − 1))− f(bi(g))− c
=f(bi(g) + δ +
δ2ηj(g)
1−δ(n−1))− f(bi(g)− c.
Now, from 0 < δ < 1
(n−1)2 , we get
ηj(g)
1−δ(n−1) <
ηj(g)
1− 1(n−1)
= ηj +
ηj
n−2 . Since k is not connected
to i in g, we have ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g) ≤ n− 2. Thus, ηj + ηjn−2 ≤ ηk + n−2n−2 = ηk + 1, implying
f(bi(g) + δ + δ
2 ηj(g)
1−δ(n−1))− f(bi(g))− c ≤ f(bi(g) + δ + δ2(ηk(g) + 1))− f(bi(g))− c,
since f is an increasing function. We conclude that for 0 < δ < 1
(n−1)2 the following holds
ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g) ⇒ ∆uBCi (g, ij) ≤ ∆uBCi (g + ik, ik).
implying that uBC satisfies SPP.
Letting ηi(g) ≤ ηj(g) and ∆uBCi (g, ik) ≥ 0, we get for 0 < δ < 1(n−1)2 the same bounds on
third order terms, implying analogously,
0 ≤ ∆uBCi (g, ik) ≤ δ + δ2ηk(g) +
∞∑
t=3
δtηk(g)(n− 1)t−2)− c
< δ + δ2(ηk(g) + 1)− c ≤ ∆uBCj (g + jk, jk),
thus uBC also satisfies AC.
Proof of Proposition 4. First note that by Hiller (2017) Proposition 1, x∗(g) ≤ x∗(g′) for all
g ⊆ g′. We get xiji (g+ ij) and xijj (g+ ij) as a solution to the system of two equations xiji (g+
ij) = x¯
(
g + ij, (xijj (g + ij),x
∗
−ij(g))
)
and xijj (g + ij) = x¯
(
g + ij, (xiji (g + ij),x
∗
−ij(g))
)
where x∗−ij(g) is the vector obtained by deleting the entries i and j from x
∗. Now, since the
best reply function x¯ is strictly increasing and for all g ⊆ g′ and x∗−ij(g) ≤ x∗−ij(g′), we also
get xijj (g+ ij) < x
ij
j (g
′+ ij) for all g ⊆ g′. Since the value function v is increasing and convex
we then get for g ⊆ g′,
∆dui(g
′ + ij, ij) = ui(g′ + ij,xij(g′ + ij))− ui(g,x∗(g′))
= v(
∑
k∈Ni(g′)
x∗k(g
′ + ij) + xijj (g
′ + ij))− v(
∑
k∈Ni(g′)
x∗k(g
′))
≥
v′′≥0
v(
∑
k∈Ni(g)
x∗k(g + ij) + x
ij
j (g
′ + ij))− v(
∑
k∈Ni(g)
x∗k(g))
≥
v′>0
v(
∑
k∈Ni(g)
x∗k(g + ij) + x
ij
j (g + ij))− v(
∑
k∈Ni(g)
x∗k(g))
= ∆dui(g + ij, ij).
24Notice that the approximations used are quite rough. For example, instead of using the empty network
as a lower bound approximation, one could instead use the star network of ηk(g) + 1 players.
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Since g, g′ ∈ G with g ⊆ g′ were chosen arbitrarily, we obtain the strategic complements
property by restricting to g, g′ with g′ − g ⊆ L−i(g′) and we obtain the convexity property
by restricting to g, g′ with g′ − g ⊆ Li(g′).
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a dominant group network gdgm and denote the set of com-
pletely connected players by E (of size |E| = m).Suppose that gdgm is not deletion proof.
Then, there exists a player i ∈ E such that ∆ui(gdgm , ij) < 0. By anonymity, ∆ui(gdgm , ij) < 0
implies ∆ui(g
dg
m , ik) < 0 for all k ∈ E \ {i} since Ni(gdgm ) \ {k} = Nk(gdgm ) \ {i}, see Lemma 1.
Let gdgm−1 := g
dg
m − Li(gdgm ) be the network obtained after deleting all of player i’s links in
gdgm which is again a dominant group network with dominant group E \ {i}. We then get by
convexity that
0 > ∆ui(g
dg
m − ik + ik, ik) ⇒ 0 > ∆ui(gdgm − Li(gdgm ) + ik, ik) = ∆ui(gdgm−1 + ik, ik)
for all k ∈ E \ {i}. By WPP, we then get ∆ui(gdgm−1 + ij, ij) < 0 for all j ∈ EC since
Nj(g
dg
m−1) ⊂ Nk(gdgm−1), k ∈ E \ {i}. Applying anonymity, we then get for any j ∈ EC ,
∆uj(g
dg
m−1 +jl, jl) < 0 for all l ∈ N \{j} since Ni(gdgm−1) = Nj(gdgm−1) = ∅. Thus, the isolated
players have no incentive to form a link, implying that the network gdgm−1 is addition proof.
We have, hence, shown that if gdgm is not deletion proof, then g
dg
m−1 is addition proof. Now,
since the complete network (m = n) is trivially addition proof and the empty network
(m = 1) is trivially deletion proof, there must exists a 1 ≤ m ≤ n such that gdgm is addition
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